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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 




UT AH~DRIVE~UR~SELF SYSTEM, 
INC., a corporation of Utah, 
and V. H. ANDERSON, 
Defendants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
120359 
Plaintiff Potter on February 2nd, 1959 rented from 
Defendants an automobile; Plaintiff testified he was a 
customer of Defendant and that he had rented automo~ 
biles from Defendant on a number of occasions over a 
period of five years (Trans. 29). Receipts were offered 
and received showing Plaintiff's rental of cars from De~ 
fendant on July 12, 1957 and September 12, 1957 (Exhs. 
1 and 2). Among other things Plaintiff g.ave his address 
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2 
as 256 Union Avenue in Midvale, an address where he 
had lived for many years, and now resides. Plaintiff still 
receives mail at that address and received mail from the 
State Tax Commission post marked December 28, 1959 
See Exhibit 6 (Line 38), although Plaintiff testified that 
recently there had been a renumbering of the houses and 
his house number now is 297 7700 South, Midvale (Tr. 
38). 
When Plaintiff returned with the car 8 days later 
(Tr. 34) Defendant Anderson refused to take the money 
for the rental of the car and instead informed Plaintiff 
he was under arrest. 
Plaintiff waited until an arresting officer arrived and 
took him into custody. He testified that he was held at 
the City Jail and later at the Couny Jail for a total of 
eight hours. Plaintiff was fingerprinted, photographed, 
booked and placed in jail (Tr. 35). 
Later Plaintiff appeared at a preliminary hearing where 
after evidence was offered by the State, the com·plaint for 
embezzlement was dismissed. 
Plaintiff thereafter commenced an action for malicious 
prosecution. At the trial Plaintiff testified he paid $300.00 
to his attorney to defend the criminal action and $50.00 
for a bond. 
The jury returned a verdict of $5,000.00 general dam .. 
ages; $350.00 special damages, making a total of 
$5,350.00. It is from the judgment on this verdict that 
Defendants appeal. 
Plaintiff's wife, Marie Potter, testified that she had 
lived at 256 Union Avenue for twenty years; that she had 
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lived at that address before she married Mr. Potter. (Tr. 
48) and that she and her husband and family are well 
known in the area; that she does church work. She testi~ 
fied that during most of the time the car Plainiff had 
rented was parked at the mouth of the driveway; that it 
was never in the garage, but in the front part of he drive~ 
way (Tr. 49). She testified that except for trips to a doc~ 
tor's office, the car remained at this point. 
Mr. Miner, the deputy county attorney, who prose~ 
cuted the action in behalf of the State of Utah, testified 
as follows (Tr. 57): 
Q. At the present time you hold public office? 
A. I am the Deputy Criminal Attorney for Salt 
Lake County. 
Q. And were you so engaged in February, 
1959? 
A. I was. 
Q. Calling your atte·ntion to on or about the 
9th of February, 1959 did you have occasion to 
have a Mr. V. H. Anderson in your office? 
A. I did. 
Q. And what did he come in for? 
A. Mr. Anderson and one of the officers of 
the Salt Lake City Police Department who is head 
of the auto~theft~ they came together into my of~ 
fice to request a complaint against a Mr. Lowell 
Potter for embezzling an automobile. 
Q. Now did they see you more than once? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. How many times did they see you? 
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A. They came on the 6th of February, 1959. 
And again on the 9th. 
Q. And again on the 9th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now what did you say to him on the 6th, 
Mr. Miner? 
A. On the 6th they presented to me a contract 
signed by Mr. Lowell Potter, in which he agreed, 
rented a car, and agreed to return it on the 2nd 
and I told them that in my opinion sufficient time 
had not elapsed to warrant a criminal complaint 
at that time because I didn't think there was 
enough time to show criminal intent, unless the 
car had been found stripped same place or outside 
of the county or outside of the state. 
Q. Now did you have any conversation rela ... 
tive to the address and the location that he had 
given? 
A. Yes. We discussed the facts of the matter, 
and, if I recall correctly, they told me, I think it 
was the officer that told me, that they could find 
no such house or no such address as 256 Union 
Avenue, and that they were of the opinion that 
this was a phoney adress and a phoney street. So 
I instructed them to go out and make a diligent 
search in the area to see if they could find this 
house, or this address, or this car, and I told them 
i'f they could find the car or the address to come 
back at some later date and we would talk to them 
again concerning a criminal complaint. 
Q. Now was that on the 6th? 
A. That was on the 6th. 
Q. Now did you see them again on the 9th? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And did they say they had made a search 
for 256 Union Avenue? 
A. If I remember correctly I talked to the offi ... 
cer and he said he had made a very diligent search 
in the area of 256 Union Avenue in Midvale; that 
he could find no such house or no such address 
or no such automobile in that area. 
Q. Now was Mr. Anderson present with him 
at the time? 
A. Yes. Mr. Anderson was present at the time. 
It is apparent from the testimony that the address of 
Potter and the location of the car could be accomplished 
with little or no effort on the part of Defendants, it is 
further apparent from the testimony that these facts were 
not disclosed to the County Attorney. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I AND II 
IN ANSWER TO POINT I AND II THE DEFEND ... 
ANTS DID NOT MAKE A COMPLETE DISCLOSURE 
OF ALL THE FACTS KNOWN TO THEM; THAT 
THE ADDRESS OF PLAINTIFF AND THE LOCA ... 
TION OF THE CAR COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY 
ASCERTAINED BY ANY REASONABLE DEGREE 
OF DILIGENCE: 
In the deposition of Lowell Potter, taken on May 28, 
1959, eight months before the trial, Potter testified that 
he lived at 256 Union Avenue, and that was his perma ... 
nent address. Mrs. Potter, as hereinabove set forth, testi ... 
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fied as to the address and her acquaintance in the neigh ... 
borhood. 
Based upon the testimony of Mr. Miner that he in ... 
structed Mr. Anderson to make a "diligent" search to 
locate 256 Union Avenue, together with the testimony 
of Mrs. Pater that she lived at this address for many years 
and prior to her marriage, that she and her husband were 
all known in the community and area, we submit that the 
question of whether Defendants 'had made a full, fair 
and complete disclosure to the prosecutor, becomes one 
of fact for the jury. 
In Uhr vs. Eaton, 95 Utah, 309, relied on so much 
by Defendant's counsel ,the Court said at page 316. 
"Turning now to the question as to whether 
a sufficient showing of lack of probable cause was 
made so as to require the submission of this issue 
to a jury, we are confronted with a rule of law that 
it is the duty of a complainant to make a full, 
fair and complete disclosure of the facts within 
his knowledge to the public prosecutor, and also 
all the facts which he had reasonable ground to 
believe existed at the time of making the statement, 
or all facts which he could have ascertained by 
reasonable diligence, and that, having done so, he 
can successfully defend, by reason of such disclos ... 
ure and the acting on the advice received thereon, 
any malicious prosecution action brought against 
him. 
"Respondent maintains that because the rec ... 
ord affirmatively shows, which it does, that she 
testified substantially to the same facts at the pre ... 
liminary hearing as she had theretofore told the 
county attorney prior to the issuance of the crimi ... 
nal complaint, that she must be classified as having 
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made a full, fair and truthful disclosure in accord ... 
ance with the rule, and therefore justly entitled to 
the directed verdict rendered. In the light of other 
facts in the record, however, taken in their most 
favorably light, which we are required to do in 
determining this question, we cannot say that re ... 
spondent is entitled to the protective cloak of this 
rule. 
Appellant contends that the respondent made 
up the story which she told the County Attorney 
and on which she relied for the conviction, and 
that such statements were false. Can it be said that 
one who concocts or "frames" another by going 
to the county attorney relating false statements, 
which appear plausible enough at the time, and 
thereby obtains the arrest of an innocent man, can 
thereafter successfully prevent a malicious prose... 
cution action from being submitted to a Jury by 
merely showing that her testimony at the prelimi ... 
nary hearing before a magistrate was substantially 
the same as related by her originally to the public 
prosecutor in the face of facts which tend to show 
that the whole story was untrue? We think not. 
The very essence of the rule is that the disclosure 
to the· prosecutor must be truthful, and when evi ... 
dence is introduced in a damage action, as here, 
by the aggrieved ·party tending to show that the 
county attorney unbeknowingly acted on deliber ... 
ate falsehoods, presented by the complainant, then 
this rule should not he used to prevent the triers 
of fact from passing on the ultimate issues. 
We accordingly hold, on the record before us, 
that there appears such a substantial conflict of 
evidence regarding the necessary elements of prob ... 
able cause as to require the submission of this issue 
to a jury. In doing so, however, we do not relax 
the time ... honored rule that a truthful and full dis ... 
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closure of the facts to a prosecutor constitutes a 
complete defense to an action of this kind. 
We feel that there was a sufficient showing of 
malice to require submission to a jury. In certain 
cases the facts from which lack of probable cause 
may be inferred may also give rise to the inference 
of malice. Ward v. United Groc. Co. 84 Utah 437, 
36 P. 2d 99. But there appears affirmatively here 
independent acts and words on the ·part of re ... 
spondent, which, if given credence, tend to sub ... 
stantiate appellant's theory. The statement of one 
witness that respondent told him before any arrest ... 
ing officer arrived hat appellant would never work 
for the company again, and also, that Mrs. Eaton 
had made statements about the plaintiff indicating 
ill will toward him; respondent's statement that 
if the witness would say that he saw appellant 
throw a package in 'her yard, he would make a 
good witness for her, and finally, the statement 
of respondent in reply to a suggestion that she tell 
Uhr that she saw him throw the bacon in the yard, 
"no, no, I would be afraid to. He is a dangerous 
snooping character," would appear to be sufficient, 
under all the facts and circumstances to justify 
-the submission of the question of malice to the Jury. 
In Sweatman vs. Linton, 66 Utah 208, 241 P. 309, The 
Plaintiff had been charged with issuing a check against 
insufficient funds. After the complaint had been dismissed 
he brought his action for malicious prosecution, Page 217, 
the Court: 
"Under that state of facts, it was a question 
for the Jury to determine whether Linton in good 
faith believed that there was cause for the prose ... 
cution of Plaintiff for a violation of the statute 
quoted.¥-~¥-
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"It must appear, however, without contradic ... 
tion, that a full and accurate statement of all the 
facts was made to the attorney before the advice 
was given, and that the party causing the prosecu ... 
tion was advised that he had probable cause to 
initiate the prosecution and that in good faith 
did believe there was probable cause.~~~ From all 
the facts appearing in this record, we are of the 
opinion that the question as to whether Linton 
in good faith believed that there was probable cause 
for the prosecution of Plaintiff, or whether he acted 
maliciously in causing the prosecution of Plaintiff, 
was for the jury." 
Again in Thomas vs. F11ost 83 Utah, 207, 27 P 2d 459, 
the Court held at p. 215: 
"The important question the Court and Jury 
had to consider was whether or not the defendant, 
in causing a complaint to be issued charging plain ... 
tiff with perjury, acted maliciously and without 
probable cause. Both must concur in order that 
the defendant be held liable. Kennedy v. Burbidge 
54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325, 4 ALR 1682 Singh vs. 
MacDonald, 55 Utah 541, 188 P. 631. 
"It is the further contention of counsel that the 
appellant made a full and complete statement of 
the facts to the county attorney, and that thereon 
the county attorney made an independent investiga ... 
tion and as a result of such investigation reached 
the conclusion that the respondent had committed 
perjury and that this under the law absolves the 
appellant from any liability to respondent, even 
though it appears that the committing magistrate 
found that here was no probable cause for the in ... 
stitution of the proceeding. But the weakness of 
these contentions, as applied to this cause, is in 
ignoring the facts that the principal issue at the 
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trial was whether appellant made a full and truth .. 
ful disclosure to the county atorney of all the facts 
known to him. There was competent testimony 
offered by the respondent, which if believed by the 
jury, conclusively proved that the appellant did 
not make a truthful statement of the facts to the 
couny attorney, but, on the conrary, mislead the 
county attorney. We refer to the testimony of the 
witness Paskett, who testified that Thomas did not 
sign the affidavit, but that Frost had brought the 
affidavit to him arid asked him to sign Thomas' 
name to it. The jury had a right to believe the testi.-
mony of Paskett and the verdict shows it believed 
him. The testimony of Paskett was sharply con .. 
tradicted by the appellant and his son, and there 
was opinion evidence given by handwriting ex ... 
perts that the hand that signed Thomas' name to 
the affidavit was Thomas' own, and other evidence 
which would have justified the jury in entirely ig.-
noring the testimony of Paskett. Where the truth 
lay was a question the jury was obliged to decide, 
and it found that the truth was with Paskett and 
not with the appellant." 
The rule is well established that it is the duty of com.-
plainant to make a full, fair and complete disclosure of the 
facts within his knowledge, and also all facts which he 
had reasonable ground to believe existed at the time of 
making the statement, or all facts which he could have 
ascertained by reasonable diligence. 
38 C.]. 434. 
This rule of law was given to the jury by the Court 
in this action by the 7th instructions {Trs. 117) as fol.-
lows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
"You are further instructed that the De .... 
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fendants are required to make and to prove to your 
satisfaction by a preponderance of testimony that 
they did make, to the County Attorney of Salt 
Lake County, a full fair and true statement of the 
material facts known to him of which he had and 
knew the means of ascertaining and if the Defend ... 
ants before instituting criminal proceedings, ob ... 
tained advise of the County Attorney and at the 
time of obtaining such advice communicated to the 
counsel or County Attorney all the facts bearing 
on the case of which they had knowledge or could 
have ascertained by reasonable diligence and in ... 
quiry, and that they acted upon the advice given 
them honestly and in good faith, the absence of 
malice is established, the want of probable cause 
is negatived, and the action for malicious prosecu ... 
tion will not lie.'' 
In Schnathorst vs. Williams, Iowa (1949) 36 NW 2nd 
739 ... 10 ALR 2nd 1199 at page 1211, the Court: 
"Defendant testified that he honestly believed, 
when he signed and swore to the information, that 
Plaintiff had stolen the car. Such testimony was 
proper and competent, but it is not conclusive. The 
important question was not his belief, but whether 
all of the facts, as he knew them or should have 
known them, were such as to justify the ordinary, 
reasonably prudent, careful and conscientious per ... 
son in reaching such a conclusion. A like conten ... 
tion was made in Shaul v. Brown, 28 Iowa 3 7, 46, 
4 Am. Rep. 151, and this Court said: 'This cannot 
be the law. No man's liberties or rights can thus 
be measured by even the honest belief of another. 
The honest belief of a person commencing a crimi ... 
nal prosecution against another, in the guilt of 
the accused is an essential element of fact for him 
in showing probable cause or in disproving the 
want of it; but he must also show due reasonable 
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ground for suspicion supported by circumstances 
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cau .. 
tious man in that belief, before his belief can be .. 
come his vindication or shield. If he should show 
such circumstances, and yet it was apparent that 
he did not himself believe in the guilt of the a c .. 
cused, they would not protect him." 
Defendant leans heavily on the defense that 
he stated his case fully and fairly to the county 
attorney and relied upon the latter's advice in start ... 
ing and pursuing the criminal prosecution. The 
fact that defendant took such counsel before acting 
is. not an absolute or conclusive defense. It may 
or may not rebut malice and want of good cause. 
To be a good defense the advise of counsel must 
have been sought in good faith, from honest mo ... 
tives, and for good purposes, after a full and fair 
disclosure of all matters having a bearing on the 
case, and the advice must have been followed in 
good faith with honest belief in the probable guilt 
of the one suspected. As said in Johnson vs. Miller, 
82 Iowa 693, 47 NW 903, 904, 48 NW 1081, 31 
Am. St. Rep. 514, "it is good faith that excuses 
from wrongfully commencing or continuing the 
criminal prosecution". Advice of counsel does not 
necessarily shield a person against a charge of rna ... 
licious prosecution. 
Mesher v. Iddings, 72 Iowa 553, 554, 34 NW 
328. 
"If, however, the defendant misrepresents the 
facts to counsel; if he does not act in good faith 
under the advice received; if he does not himself 
believe that there is cause for the prosecution of 
action ... and acts in bad faith in originating and 
urging the prosecution; he will not be protected, 
and in such cases the integrity or bona fides of his 
conduct is a question of fact for the jury." 
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Center v. Spring, 2 Iowa 
In Bair v. Schultz, supra, 227 Iowa 193, 201, 
288 NW 119, 123, we quoted from Wilson v. 
Thurlow, 156 Iowa 656, 658, 137 NW 956, as 
follows: 
"Whether defendant in good faith acted on the 
advice of the County Attorney is generally a ques ... 
tion for the jury. \Xlhite v. International Text ... 
Book Co. 144 Iowa 92, 121 NW 1104. Advice of 
an attorney to constitute a good defense must be 
based on a full and fair statement of the facts with ... 
in defendant's knowledge, and the advice must have 
been acted on in good faith and with the belief that 
there was good cause for the prosecution, and 
whether or not these were done is a jury question. 
(Citing decisions.) "In Dickson v. Young, supra, 
208 Iowa 1, 6, 221 NW 820, 822, the court said: 
"Ordinarily, the question as to whether such dis ... 
closures were made in good faith, and the advice 
of an attorney obtained, are questions of fact to 
be submitted to the Jury". 
On this question in Wilson v. Lapham, supra, 
196 Iowa 745, 750, 195 NW 235, 237, we said: 
"Obviously, this is ordinarily a question of fact 
for the jury." 
Advice of counsel cannot be used as a subter ... 
fuge. As said by the eminent Chief Justice Shaw 
in, Wills v. Noyes, 12 Pick, Mass. 324, 327, 328; 
"But even legal advice, if used only as a cover, and 
not acted upon in good faith - if it does not in ... 
duce an honest belief that the party has probable 
cause, will not screen him from the consequences 
of prosecuting an entirely groundless suit." The 
Maryland Court in Turner v. Walker, 3 Gil & J 
377, 22 Am. Dec. 329, 334, said "But in an action 
for a malicious prosecution, . . . it is not enough, 
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as has been supposed, for the defendant merely to 
show that he acted under professional advice, the 
want of probable cause having first been estab ... 
lished. He may 'have done that, and believed that 
he acted legally, and yet have acted maliciously and 
for the purpose of oppression. And having acted 
maliciously and oppressively and without reason ... 
able or probable cause, his belief alone, that he 
acted legally will not support him in his malicious 
and oppressive violation of the law. However far 
his taking professional advice should go, if standing 
alone, to show his absence of malice, and a desire 
to act legally and correctly; yet it is evidence only 
to go to the jury for that purpose, and may be re ... 
buted by other surrounding circumstances the 
whole of which should go to the jury." 
POINT III 
IN ANSWER TO POINT III OF APPELLANTS' 
BRIEF, DEFENDANT HAD THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF THAT HE HAD MADE A FULL, AND COM ... 
PLETE DISCLOSURE OF ALL THE MATERIAL 
FACTS TO THE COUNTY ATIORNEY, WHO ON 
HIS OWN VOLITION ADVISED THE ISSUANCE 
OF A CRIMINAL COMPLAINT, AND DEFENDANT 
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THAT BURDEN. 
10 ALR 2nd 1272, #20 BURDEN OF PROOF. 
''The defense of advice of counsel is an affirma ... 
tive one, the burden of esablishing which rests 
upon the defendant in a maliciou~ prosecution 
action. See Diggs v. Arnold Bros. ( 1033) 132 Cal. 
App. 518, 23 P. 2d 71, wherein apparently the 
district attorney, as well as private attorneys, was 
consulted. 
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The defendant in a malicious prosecution ac~ 
tion has the burden of proving that the advice of 
private counsel and commonwealth's attorney was 
sought and obtained with the honest purpose of 
being informed as to the law and upon a full, cor~ 
rect and honest disclosure of all the material facts 
within his knowledge, or which should have been 
within his knowledge if 'he had made a reasonably 
careful investigation. Commander v. Provident Re ... 
lief Asso. ( 1920) 126 Va. 455, 102 SE 89. 
In Alb'Yiecht v. Ward (1900) 91 Ill. App. 38, 
it was held that the defense of advice of the state's 
attorney given after a full and fair disclosure of 
material facts, and acted upon in good faith was 
an affirmative one required to be sustained by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
In Shaffer vs. Arnaelsteen ( 1921 54 Cal. App. 
719, 202 P 946, considered further, supra 4, it 
was held that to support the affirmative defense 
of advice of counsel the defendant in a malicious 
prosecution action must show by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he made to the deputy prose~ 
cuting attorney, a full, fair and true statement of 
all the material facts, "known to him, of which he 
had and knew the means of ascertaining." 
And in Beadle v. Harrison ( 1920), 58 Mont. 
606, 194 P. 134, the Court pointed out that where 
a prima facie case was made out by the plaintiff 
in a malicious ·prosecution action, the defendant 
must rebut if by showing the existence of probable 
cause, which 'he could do by the affirmative defense 
that he fully and fairly and in good faith disclosed 
all of the facts to the county atorney." 
That a defendant in a malicious prosecution 
action made a full and complete disclosure of all 
the facts to an attorney who advised a prosecution 
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is in the nature of an affirmative defense, the bur ... 
den of proving which is on the defendant, see Low ... 
ther vs. Metzker ( 1949) - Idaho - 203 P 2d 604. 
Ag.ain, in Scsnathorst v. Williams (1949) Iowa 
- 36 NW 2d 739, 10 ALR 2d 1199 (Supra) 
where defendant in a malicious prosecution action 
pleaded specially and affirmatively the defense of 
advice of the county attorney, it was held that the 
burden was on the defendant to establish good faith 
in seeking and acting upon the advice of the coun ... 
ty attorney. 
This principle was reaffirmed in the recent (1956) 
case of Cottrell vs. Grand Union Tea Company, 5 Utah 
2nd, 187, 299 P. 2nd 622; Our Court held 
"That defendants made full disclosure of facts 
to prosecuting attorney who advised filing of com ... 
plaint is defense to action for malicious prosecution 
but it is an affirmative defense, the burden resting 
u·pon defendants to establish it by preponderance 
of evidence." 
Mr. Justice Crockett: 
"From the foregoing facts, one does not wonder 
that the jury was not convinced that Mr. Taylor 
was given to understand the method of operation 
between parties. This should have been made clear 
to him by Mr. Fives and Mr. Pope who were seek ... 
ing the prosecution. They were businessmen who 
either were, or should have· been, entirely familiar 
with the facts and circumstances, and should have 
been acting with caution and circumspection in 
regard to a matter so serious as charging the plain ... 
tiff with a felony. From the dealings of these parties 
as disclosed by the evidence the conclusion is not 
at all unreasonable that the company was simply 
using the pressure of potential criminal prosecu ... 
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tion to enforce its demands against Mr. Cottrell, 
which is expressly denounced by our statute. Stickle 
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., Utah, 251 P. 2d, 867, 
871 Newton vs. Oregon Short LineR. R. 43 Utah, 
219, 134 P. 567. 
This case having been tried to a jury, they were the 
exclusive judges of the evidence and of the inferences 
to be drawn therefrom. It was not the privilege of the 
court to disagree with and overrule their action unless 
the evidence so unerringly pointed to a contrary conclu ... 
sion that there existed no reasonable basis for the jury's 
finding. This court has many times affirmed commitment 
to a policy of reluctance to interfere with findings of fact 
and verdicts rendered by juries and has declared that it 
should be done only when the matter is so clear as to be 
free from doubt. 
In Butz v. Union Pacific R. R. 120 Utah, 85, 232 P. 
332, we quoted with approval the language of Justice 
Murphy, speaking for the United States Supreme Court 
with respect to trial by jury: "~~~A right so fundamental 
and sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the· Con ... 
stitution or provided by statute, should be jealously 
guarded by the courts." Again in Sticle v. Union Pac. R. R. 
we stated"~~~ we remain cognizant of the vital importance 
of the privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice and 
deem it our duty to zealously protect and preserve it. ~~:t­
Upon the basis of the self ... interest of the defendant's wit ... 
nesses and the uncertainties and other unsatisfactory aspects 
of their evidence, hereinabove discussed, there is ample basis 
upon which the jury, acting fairly and reasonably, could re ... 
fuse to believe and find that there had been a full, fair and 
truthful disclosure of all the material facts to Mr. Taylor. 
Therefore, the trial court should not have in effect over ... 
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ruled their determination and substituted his own con ... 
elusion that such disclosure had been established as a mat ... 
ter of law. 
The case is remanded with instructions to reinstate 
verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff and to enter 
judgment thereon." 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS ANSWER PLAINTIFF'S POINT 
IV THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF 
MALICE AND WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE, TO 
GO TO THE JURY. 
THE COURT INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS 
FOLLOWS: (Tr. 115) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
"You may infer malice from the absence of any 
reasonable or probable cause justifying Defendants' 
acts. In other words if you find from the evidence 
that Defendants acted without any reasonable, jus ... 
tifiable or probable cause in charging Plaintiff with 
the felony resulting in his arrest, publicity and em ... 
barrassment, you may infer malice from such con ... 
duct." 
5 ALR 1688" The failure of a person who has 
received information tending to show the commis ... 
sian of a crime to make further inquiry or investi ... 
gation as an ordinarily prudent man would have 
made under the circumstances before instituting a 
prosecution renders him liable for want of probable 
cause. (cases therein cited) ~¥-~ (p. 1691). A fail ... 
ure to make an investigation before instituting pro ... 
ceedings constitutes a want of probable cause when 
the information received is such as to put an ordin ... 
arily prudent and caution person on injuiry. Dun ... 
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lay v. New Zealand F. & M. Ins. C~o. (1895, 109 
Cal. 365, 42 Pac. 29; Coyle vs. Scnellenberg (1906) 
30 Pa. Supra Ct. 246. 
~~~when the facts are easily obtainable, a 
failure to make an inquiry before instituting a 
prosecution constitutes a want of probable cause. 
Lacy v. Mitchell ( 1864) 23 Ind. 67; Lawrence vs. 
Leathers ( 1903) 31 Ind. App. 414, 68 N.E. 179; 
Boyd v. Mendenhall (1893 53 Minn. 274,55 N. W. 
45; Sweet v. Smith ( 1899) 42 App. Div. 502, 59 
N. T. Supp. 404. And see the cases cited supra 
in II. a. 
In Lacy v. Mitchell (Ind.) supra, it appeared 
that the daughter of a landlord saw the tenant 
feed his chickens with some shelled com. Both 
the tenant and the landlord kept shelled corn in 
the same barn. 
The daughter also thought that her father's pile 
of com looked as if a bushel had been taken there--
from. The landlord thereupon prosecuted the ten--
ant. The court held that; as the landlord could 
easily have learned the truth by speaking with the 
tenant, there was a want of probable cause. The 
Court said: "Probable cause may be defined to be 
that apparent state of facts found to exist under 
reasonable inquiry; that is, such inquiry as the 
given case rendered convenient and proper, which 
would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent 
man to believe the accused person had committed, 
in a criminal case, the crime charged; and in a civil 
case, that a cause of action existed . . . We do not 
think probable cause for the prosecution was 
shown, considering all the circumstances. Lacy 
could have easily learned the facts of the case by 
speaking with Mitchell who was near him. 
He should have made more inquiry, under the 
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circumstances of this case. If he really believea 
that Mitchell had stolen his corn, the belief arose 
from his own negligence. 
Again in Kennedy vs. Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P. 
325 at p. 506 this Court stated this rule as follows: Thur ... 
man J. 
"We are not disposed to hold that a prosecutor 
acts without probable cause merely because it turns 
out that the information upon which he acts was 
false. But where, in addition to this fact, it is shown 
that the prosecutor either knew that the informa ... 
tion upon which he aced was false, or had no per ... 
sonal knowledge of its truth, and made no investi ... 
tion to determine its accuracy before instituting 
the prosecution a different question is presented. 
A judgment obtained under either of said condi ... 
tions should have no standing in a court of justice 
as evidence of probable cause, much less be treated 
as conclusive. While every reasonable allowance 
should be made for possible errors and mistakes, 
we know of no reason why in a case of this kind 
a judgment wrongfully or recklessly procured 
should be used as evidence by the wrongdoer to 
defeat the person injured in his efforts to obtain 
redress." 
Again in the case of Schnathorst v. Williams, Ia. -
10 ALR 2d 1199 from which we have heretofore quoted 
above, the Court held that the ''malice which is an in ... 
gredient of a cause of action for malicious prosecution is 
not ill will, hatred or express malice, but a want of prob ... 
able cause. 
The Court at p. 1210 "There was no burden 
on plaintiff to show "ill will," "hatred," or "ex ... 
press malice" on the part of the defendant. Malice 
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may be shown from want of probable cause, or 
froma prima facie showing thereof. As said, by 
quotation ,i nConnelly v. White, 122 Iowa 391, 
393, 9 BNW 144, 145: "Malice in law is where 
malice is established by legal presumption from 
proof of certain facts . . . Malice in fact is to be 
found by the jury from the evidence in the case. 
They may infer it from want of probable cause. 
But it is well established that the plaintiff is not 
required to prove express malice, in the pOpular 
signification of the term, as that defendant was 
prompted by malevolence, or acted from motives of 
ill will, resentment, or hatred toward the plain~ 
tiff It issufficient if he prove it in its enlarged legal 
sense. ~~~ ''The fact that the action was com~ 
menced and prosecuted without probable cause 
may be considered by the jury on the question of 
malice . . . The malice required to support the ac~ 
tion may be inferred by the jury from want of 
probable cause." 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that Plaintiff is entitled to have the judg~ 
ment of the District Court affirmed. Had Defendants 
made any reasonable search for the car at the address or 
in the general neighborhood of Midvale, undoubtedly, the 
car would have been located, there would have been no 
arrest, and this lawsuit would not have been filed. It was 
the lack of any diligence on the part of Defendants which 
caused the issuance of the complaint, although Defend~ 
ants would like to shift the blame to the County Attorney. 
Potter was known to Defendant and as we have pointed 
out had done business with them on a number of previous 
occasions. 
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It would have been a comparatively simple matter for 
Defendants to locate the Plaintiff and the car had they 
exercised any d~gree of diligence. 
We therefore feel that the verdict and judgment were 
fair and equitable and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted 
LaMAR DUNCAN, 
Attorney for Respondent 
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